We extend the literature on secondary issues of common stock by examining long-run stock and operating performance. In contrast to the performance of primary equity issuers, the long-run stock performance of firms following secondary distributions is positive, but not significant. For a subsample of secondary issuers in which the seller is an insider, however, both three-and five-year post-issue abnormal stock returns are significantly negative. The operating performance of these firms also declines subsequent to the issue. This supports the hypothesis that the negative performance of secondary equity offerings can partly be attributed to managers exploiting "windows of opportunity" by issuing overvalued shares.
Introduction
A longstanding question in the finance literature is whether informed insiders can profit by selling during "windows of opportunity" when their equity is overvalued. 1 Much of the early research focuses on the short run market reaction to security sales. As argued by Scholes (1972) , "if a sale of securities is an indication that the seller possesses information, the price of the shares will fall in the market to reflect the expected value of the information in each trade" ( p. 183). The evidence has been overwhelmingly consistent with this prediction. Several studies examine direct sales by insiders of their personal holdings. These sales can take two basic forms: open market sales and secondary equity offerings.
2 Jaffe (1974) and Seyhun (1986) examine open market sales of equity by investors required to disclose their sales under insider trading laws. Scholes (1972) and Mikkelson and Partch (1985) examine registered and unregistered secondary offerings. 3 Other research also examines insiders' ability to indirectly profit by selling overvalued new shares to the public through a seasoned equity offering (Asquith and Mullins, 1986 , Masulis and Korwar, 1986 , and Mikkelson and Partch, 1986 . In all cases the market reaction to the sale (either at the announcement of a registered offering or on 1 This issue has also become very relevant for practitioners in light of the Nasdaq market meltdown in April 2000. Johnson (Washington Post, July 2, 2000) discusses a number of cases where insiders sold shares prior to the deterioration of the ir firm's share price. 2 Secondary offers are sales of outstanding shares by existing shareholders that take place after the market's close. These offers require the approval of the exchange(s) on which the securities are listed. Rule 393 of the NYSE, for example, states that approval of a secondary distribution is based on the judgment of exchange officials that the block of securities cannot be absorbed in the normal course of trading. 3 The Securities Act of 1933 requires registration with the SEC of a public offering of a firm's outstanding shares if the seller has a control relationship with the firm. In this case, a prospectus that contains information about the selling shareholder, the securities being sold, the terms of the offering and the selling arrangements is filed prior to the actual offering. For registered offerings, studies examine the date the sale is first announced to the public, while for unregistered offers, the actual date of the sale is examined since there is no prior announcement.
the day of an unregistered sale) has been negative. Interestingly, the magnitude of the market reaction has been similar (-2% to -3%) across different types of sales.
More recently, research has examined long-run stock returns following security sales. If informed insiders attempt to profit (either directly or indirectly) by selling overvalued equity and the market does not fully capitalize the negative information around the sale, then long-run abnormal stock returns after the sale should be negative. 4 An extensive literature has found that abnormal performance following open market sales by corporate insiders is significantly negative. 5, 6 Similarly, a number of studies have documented poor long-run stock performance of firms following seasoned equity offerings.
7 Surprisingly, there has been little research on the long-run stock performance following secondary offerings. One notable exception is Lee's (1997) study of insider trading around equity offerings between 1976 and 1990 . Lee finds that long-run abnormal performance following registered secondary offerings (defined as offers where less than 50% of the shares are new) is not significantly negative. Since the evidence on insider trading and seasoned equity offerings suggests insiders can profitably time security sales, it is perhaps surprising that they do not appear to use this ability when selling their own shares through a secondary offering. 4 In an efficient market, long-run performance should not be significantly negative regardless of seller motives. While better-informed insiders might want to sell shares when their stock is overpriced, the market would react to the sale in a manner that eliminates this overpricing. Thus, the windows of opportunity hypothesis requires that the market is not efficient. 5 See, for example, Seyhun (1986 ( , 1988 ( , 1992 ( , and 1998 ( ), Meulbroek (1992 , Chowdhury, Howe and Lin (1993) and Pettit and Venkatesh (1995) . 6 Gompers and Lerner (1998) look at venture capital distributions, which are 'sales' of securities from venture capital funds to their limited partners. If venture capital funds are viewed as 'informed investors', these distributions are economically equivalent to insider trading but they are not regulated and no disclosure is required. Interestingly, the short and long-run abnormal performance of shares in firms being distributed is similar to that for legal (and disclosed) insider trading. 7 See, for example, Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995).
The purpose of this paper is to update and extend earlier research on secondary equity offerings. We first examine the long-run stock performance following registered secondary offerings. Our analysis differs from Lee's (1997) in four significant respects.
First, we focus on pure secondary offerings (i.e. offerings where no new shares are offered to the public). Second, we examine offerings from a longer and more recent time period (1980 to 1996) . Third, we measure abnormal performance using multiple approaches, many of which had not been widely considered when Lee published his study. 8 Finally, following Scholes (1972) and Mikkelson and Partch (1985) , we focus on the identity of the seller. As noted in those papers, some sellers in secondary offerings are more likely to possess inside information and be in a position to exploit windows of opportunity by selling when they believe their stock is overvalued.
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For our sample of secondary offers, we find that the mean three-and five-year abnormal returns are 5.93% (p=0.876) and 1. 99% (p=0.605) . This is consistent with Lee (1997) and suggests that windows of opportunity are not important for secondary sales.
Our findings are dramatically affected when we distinguish between sales by "insiders", individuals with presumably better knowledge of the firm and its valuation, and "noninsiders". When the seller is an insider, the average three-year abnormal buy-and-hold 8 One explanation for findings of significant long-run abnormal performance following corporate events is that they are merely an illusion arising from mis-specified tests for long-run abnormal performance (see Fama, 1998 , Brav, Gezcy, and Gompers, 2000 , or Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli, 2000 . In an effort to control for this possibility, we demonstrate the robustness of our findings to numerous alternative methodologies that have been proposed in the literature. 9 The identity of the seller is revealed in every offering prospectus if the offering is registered. In a non-registered offering, the first public disclosure is typically on the news tape of the exchange or a news wire shortly before the distribution becomes effective. This announcement reveals the identity of the firm whose shares are being sold and the number of shares offered, but does not usually contain the identity of the seller. Because we are interested in the relation between the seller and the returns to the firm on and after the offer date, we focus on registered secondary offers. 10 A related area of research studies block trades. Block trades are smaller than secondary distributions in terms of the percentage of equity traded, and block trades can be initiated by the return is -15.66% (p=0.046). The five-year abnormal return averages -33.33%
(p=0.015). The media n five-year raw return after secondary offers by insiders is 0.00%.
We confirm the significance of this negative performance using several alternative factor models, in addition to regression analyses. The evidence is consistent with the windows of opportunity hypothesis. For non-insiders, long-run performance is generally positive but not significant. This is consistent with non-insiders selling for non-opportunistic reasons.
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We next attempt to identify the source of the negative abnormal stock Long-run performance continues in the same direction as the announcement period return. In the context of a secondary offering, this underreaction theory predicts negative post-offering long-run performance, consistent with the short-run market reaction. Our evidence is not consistent with this theory. Long-run abnormal performance is unrelated to the abnormal market reaction at the time of offering announcement.
An alternative theory, proposed by Loughran and Ritter (1997) , considers how investors form expectations about future performance. Loughran and Ritter argue that investors rely too heavily on past experience. Given the positive operating and stock performance of firms prior to issuing, investors are often too optimistic about the buyer or the seller. Unlike block trades, secondary distributions create a more diffuse ownership base. For more information, see Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987, 1990) . 11 For example, they may simply be trying to reduce their holdings for diversification purposes. Alternatively, existing shareholders may be selling for non-discretionary reasons. For example, a CEO that has been forced to resign might sell his or her shares. In this case, the sale is also nonopportunistic.
prospects of issuing firms. This "anchoring" theory argues that operating performance will mean revert on average and long-run abnormal stock performance will arise because investors expect past trends to continue.
To test this theory in the context of secondary offerings, we examine the operating performance of firms around the offering. Median operating performance prior to the secondary issue is positive, relative to a matched portfolio benchmark, for both insiders and non-insiders. However, when insiders are selling, the median operating performance declines significantly after the issue. This decrease in abnormal performance from the pre-issue to the post-issue period is significantly negative for the insider sample, but not for the non-insider sample. We also find that the long-run abnormal stock performance of secondary issuers is positively correlated with changes in abnormal operating performance. Overall, the operating performance of firms in which insiders versus noninsiders sell shares through secondary offers is consistent with Loughran and Ritter's (1997) anchoring argument. 12 A final objective of our study is simply to update prior findings on the characteristics of secondary offerings and the market response to the announcement of secondary offerings. Mikkelson and Partch's (1985) sample ends in 1981, near the start of our sample period. It is of interest, therefore, whether evidence for a more recent period differs in any significant respects. The average number of share offered in our sample is 18 percent of shares outstanding, which is over twice the relative size of 8% documented by Mikkelson and Partch. The short-term market reaction to secondary offering announcements in our sample is very similar to that found by
Mikkelson and Partch. The mean reaction is -2.25% over the three-day period around 12 Contemporaneous work by Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck, and Rees (2001) finds that investors are overoptimistic about the prospects of firms issuing private equity. However, they find that investor optimism at the time of private issues is not due to the tendency to overweight recent experience.
offering announcement, and the reaction is negative across all types of sellers. Overall, this evidence suggests that recent secondary offerings are viewed by the market as similar to offerings form prior periods.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we identify the sample of secondary offerings. In section 3 we replicate prior studies of the short-term market reaction to a secondary offering announcement. In section 4, we present our evidence on the long-run stock performance of secondary issuers. In section 5 we present evidence on the operating performance of secondary issuers. Finally, we present our conclusions in section 6.
Sample Selection
We compile a sample of pure secondary offerings of common stock between 1980
and 1996 from Security Data Corporation's New Issue Database. In order to remain in the final sample, a firm must satisfy the following criteria:
1) The common stock is listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ and has security returns available from CRSP.
2) The security is not a real estate investment trust, ADR, or closed-end mutual fund.
3) The firm has a non-negative book equity value available from COMPUSTAT for the fiscal year end before the equity offering. As noted above, insiders are separated into two groups based on whether the insider is still active in the firm and has discretion over the timing of secondary sales.
Searches of Dow Jones News Retrieval revealed that in approximately 10% of the cases, the secondary sale was by a Chairman or CEO who had already retired or who was being forced to step down and was selling his shares as part of the termination agreement (i.e.
sale was non-discretionary). Since these sales are likely motivated by liquidity or control considerations, rather than an attempt to exploit inside information, we do not classify them as insider sales. Instead we label these as sales by non-discretionary insiders (see Appendix A for details on these sales from Lexis/Nexus). 
Descriptive Statistics and Short-Term Return Analysis
In Table 2 we examine the characteristics of firms registering secondary shares.
The mean (median) market capitalization is $931.36 ($369.65) million. The mean market-to-book ratio, calculated as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity in the fiscal year prior to the offer, is 6.00 (significantly higher than the median of 3.4 15 ). The mean (median) offer size is $102.16 million ($50.11 million). The number of secondary shares offered as a fraction of shares outstanding averages 18%, 14 Thirteen of the insider observations are in business services, 16 are in retail and the remainder are distributed reasonably evenly across other industry groups. 15 This is due to a handful of recent initial public offerings with very low book values in the year prior to the issue. Book value generally increases significantly the following year in these cases.
indicating that the sellers are liquidating a significant portion of the total equity of the firm. This is almost twice the 8% of shares outstanding documented by Mikkelson and Partch (1985) . However, we find that the ratio of secondary shares offered to average daily trading volume for the firm is 98.1, which is similar to the 96.5 found in Mikkelson and Partch. This is consistent with the NYSE's Rule 393, which states that approval of a secondary distribution is based on the judgement of exchange officials that the block of securities could not be absorbed in the normal course of trading.
There are several significant differences across types of sellers. 16 The mean market capitalization for firms with sales by insiders is significantly smaller (at the 5% level) than the mean for non-insider sales firms (although the medians are not significantly different). When the subgroups are considered, however, only sales by investment funds and trusts take place in firms with significantly greater market capitalization (at the 10% or better level) than firms where insiders sell. 17 The mean offer size for firms with sales by insiders is significantly smaller (at the 10% level) than the mean for non-insider sales firms (although the medians are not significantly different). When the subgroups are considered, only sales by investment funds are in firms with significantly greater (at the 5% level) offer size than firms where insiders sell. However, sales by forced insiders take place in firms with significantly smaller offering size (at the 5% level) than firms where insiders sell. 18 The market to book for firms where insiders sell is significantly higher (at the 5% level) than all non-insider groups.
Panel B of Table 2 examines announcement period returns to secondary issuers.
We define the announcement date as the earliest of the filing date from SDC or the date Dow Jones News Retrieval first reports the offering. Our sample experiences an abnormal runup of 13.09% in the 60 days prior to the offer. The runup is most positive for insider sales (the 18.94% return is significantly more positive, at the 5% level or better, than the returns for sales by all other groups). In the three-day window surrounding the announcement date, secondary issuers exhibit a mean (median) abnormal return of -2.25% (-2.07%), which is significant at the one-percent level. This is slightly smaller than the -2.87% documented in Mikkelson and Partch (1985) for an earlier time period (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) . Between the announcement and offer dates (median length of interval = 17 days), the firms earn a positive return of 0.63%. Consistent with Mikkelson and Partch, we find no significant price reaction around the offer date.
We also examine the announcement period excess returns by type of seller.
Consistent with Mikkelson and Partch (1985) , we find negative and significant abnormal returns for each category of seller. The negative reaction is most severe for issues where the seller is likely to have access to proprietary information about the firm's future prospects. Secondary offers by insiders have significant returns of -2.77%. Non-insiders as a whole have announcement period returns of -2.11%. When the non-insider group is further divided, sellers categorized as investment funds have the lowest returns at -3.05%, although this is not significantly different than the return for insider sales. The only group with significantly le ss negative market reaction to the offering announcement is "other", where the market reaction to announcement is -1.47%. Overall, the results are consistent with the market interpreting the news of secondary sales by groups with access to better information regarding the firm's prospects more negatively.
We perform regression analysis to determine if the market reaction to insider sales is more negative than to sales by other groups. To control for the differences between insiders and non-insiders that we document in our univariate results, we regress three-day abnormal returns on control variables such as stock price runup, size of the firm, and market-to-book. Specifically, the dependent variable is the issuer return from day -1 to day +1 relative to the offer less the return on the CRSP value weighted index over the same period (AR3). Independent variables include the issuer's buy and hold return over the year prior to the issue (RUNUP), the natural logarithm of the issuers market capitalization (shares outstanding multiplied by price per share) on the offering date (LGMKCAP) and the natural logarithm of the market-to-book ratio, defined as the offer date market capitalization divided by the book value of equity after the issue (LGMB). In 
Long-Run Stock Performance Following Secondary Offerings

Matching Portfolios and Long-run Abnormal Returns
In order to comp ute long-run abnormal returns, we follow a nonparametric simulation procedure similar to those used by Lee (1997) and Lee and Loughran (1998) , and test whether the performance of secondary issuers is significantly different from other companies with similar size, market-to-book, and prior performance. First, in each month, all eligible NYSE firms are sorted into deciles according to their market value of equity, calculated as shares outstanding times the closing price during that month. As in Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999), we further divide the smallest size decile into quintiles, resulting in 14 size portfolios. Next, Nasdaq and AMEX firms are placed into the appropriate size portfolio. Within each size portfolio, firms are further sorted into quintiles according to their market-to-book ratio. For issuing firms, the market-to-book ratio is calculated as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity in the fiscal year prior to the offer. In an effort to control for momentum, we further divide the portfolios into three groups based on raw stock performance over the previous year, resulting in 210 (14 x 5 x 3) portfolios each month.
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Each issuer is then matched with all non-issuing firms in the same size, market-tobook, and prior performance portfolio in the month of the issue. For each sample firm, we calculate buy-and-hold returns for one, three, and five years after the issue date. For firms delisted prior to the five-year anniversary of their offer date, the buy-and-hold returns stop on the issuer's delisting date. The buy-and-hold returns of each matching firm are calculated over the identical period as the issuer. If a matching firm delists prior to the end of the five-year horizon (or its matched issuer's delisting date, whiche ver is earlier), we splice the CRSP value-weighted return into the calculation from the day after delisting date. The reference portfolio for each issuing firm is then the equal-weighted average of the returns to all its matched firms. Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) note that there is no investment in newly listed firms subsequent to the issue, nor is there monthly rebalancing of the portfolio in this approach. Consequently, we avoid the new listing bias and the rebalancing bias. Abnormal performance is defined as the difference between the return to the issuer and the return to the appropriately matched size, market-to-book, and prior performance reference portfolio.
Finally, statistical inference is based on the pseudo-portfolio approach first introduced by Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron (1992) and Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) . This approach generates the empirical distribution of long-run abnormal stock returns. Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) find that this approach yields well-specified test-statistics in random samples. 21 The procedure is as follows. For each sample firm, we randomly select with replacement a firm that is in the same size/market- 21 In order to get the proper limiting behavior of the empirical distribution function, it is necessary to assume that returns are independent. While this independence assumption may be violated, the magnitude of the resulting bias is likely small. Barber, Lyon, and Tsai (1999) find that this approach is well specified in a variety of sampling situations. Partly as a check on this to-book/momentum portfolio in event month t. We continue this process until each firm in the original secondary sample is represented by a control firm in this pseudo-portfolio.
Next, we calculate the mean long-run abnormal performance for this pseudo-portfolio using the reference portfolio approach discussed above. This yields one observation of the mean abnormal performance from randomly forming a portfolio with the same size, market-to-book, and prior performance characteristics as the original sample. This process is repeated until we have 1,000 pseudo-portfolios, and consequently 1,000 mean abnormal return observations. The null hypothesis is that the mean long-run abnormal return of the issuers equals the mean long-run abnormal return for the 1,000 pseudoportfolios. We test whether the average issuing firm's return is significantly less than the mean return from the 1,000 pseudo-portfolios using the p -value from the resulting empirical distribution: Loughran and Ritter (1995) , Lee (1997), and Kahle (2000) . Interestingly, secondary issuers as a whole do not appear to exhibit the negative abnormal performance found for other secondary equity offerings. We find that after three years, secondary issuers display insignificantly positive abnormal returns of 5.93%; after five years, they have earned insignificantly positive abnormal returns of 1.99%. Median abnormal returns are more negative. The abnormal median return after one year is an insignificant 1.14%, after three years is an insignificant -9.05%, but after five years is a significant -25.33%.
The initial long-run performance results presented in Table 3 are generally not consistent with the windows of opportunity hypothesis. 22 Examining the average return to all secondary issuers, however, ignores an important characteristic of the issue: the identity of the seller. We also report the long-run performance of secondary issues by insiders versus non-insiders in Table 3 . The three-and five-year mean raw returns to insiders are about half of those to non-insiders as a whole. When non-insiders are further subdivided, the issues by the insider group perform uniformly worse than issues by any other group. The evidence from the medians is similar to that of the mean returns. In fact, the median five-year raw return is 0% for the subsample in which insiders make the secondary offer, versus 52.7% for non-insiders as a whole! Panel B of Table 3 documents the mean and median abnormal buy-and-hold returns, calculated relative to a control portfolio of similar size, market to book and prior performance. For the non-insider group, the mean abnormal performance is positive but not significant, while the median abnormal performance at three and five years is negative but not significant. When the non-insider subgroups are examined in further detail, the mean and median long-run abnormal returns in these subgroups are generally not significant, and are never significantly negative (the three-year median abnormal return for trusts is significantly positive). 23 Overall, firms with secondary sales by noninsiders do not exhibit negative long-run performance.
The performance of firms following secondary offerings by insiders provides a striking contrast to the performance following secondary offers as a whole. While the three-and five-year mean returns to all other groups are positive, the returns to the insider 23 Some returns are quite large, even though they are not significant. For example, the five-year mean abnormal return for non-discretionary insiders is 58%. Also the five-year mean abnormal return for trusts is 75%. Since economically large, our tests may simply not have sufficient power to detect significance. In these cases, we conjecture that control and governance issues are likely to be important. If an entrenched CEO steps down or is forced out, agency problems may be alleviated if the new CEO is more shareholder friendly. An example of this is provided by JLG Industries. John L. Grove founded JLG in 1969. After a performance decline in 1991-1992, the company became involved in an internal dispute between Grove and other senior management. On July 17, 1992, a special committee of outside directors recommended that Grove "concentrate on board activities and withdraw from day-to-day operational responsibilities." After continued disagreements, Grove was ousted as chairman. As part of the "amicable" settlement, he disposed of his 16.5% stake, partly through a secondary offer in 1993. Following this, the new management team instigated numerous employee incentives and decentralized its decision making process. The result was substantial new product development, large cost savings, and a five-year abnormal return of over 500%. See Lehn and Treml (1999) for additional details. Likewise, half of the trusts in our sample are family trusts or charitable foundations started by the founder or CEO. If these trusts tend to vote with management, then the sale of a block of shares held by the trust may result in increased monit oring of management. Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) show that institutional investors that have existing business relations with management are more likely to vote with management on management-proposed antitakeover amendments. A more detailed examination of the trusts shows that of the 31 secondary sales by trusts, nine can be attributed to the death of the founder. Six more appear to be related to analysts and institutional investors requesting that the family sell to increase liquidity. The mean three-and five-year abnormal performance of these firms is 41% and 63%, respectively.
group are negative and significant. When the seller is a top manager who is still involved in the daily operations of the company, the three-year abnormal return is -15.66% (p=0.046). The mean five-year abnormal return is -33.33% (p=0.015).
These results provide evidence consistent with the window of opportunity hypothesis. When the secondary sale is by an insider who has access to proprietary information about the firm's future prospects and has discretion over the timing of sales, the performance of the firm following the secondary offer is significantly negative. For other sellers, the returns tend to be positive but not significant.
In Table 4 we examine the relation between three-year abnormal performance and the identity of the seller in a multivariate setting. 24 To control for the differences between insiders and non-insiders that we document in our univariate results, we regress threeyear abnormal returns on control variables such as stock price runup, size of the firm, and market-to-book. In regression (1) of Table 4 , we also include a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the seller is an insider, as defined previously. 25 After controlling for size, market to book, and prior performance, the coefficient on the insider dummy is negative and significant. This supports the univariate results in Table 3 and our hypothesis that firm performance is significantly worse following secondary issues by insiders.
24 Similar results are obtained if we examine three-year raw returns or five-year raw and abnormal returns. 25 As in the analysis of short-run returns around secondary offerings, we include a time period dummy variable and a dummy variable for recent initial public offering firms. These dummy variables were not significant in any specification. We also examine the reputation of the investment bank marketing the secondary offering, where reputation is proxied by the three-year market share of the book manager in all seasoned equity offerings (using similar exclusion criteria to that noted in section 2) in the three years prior to the offering. The average market share for banks in secondary offerings by non-discretionary insiders is significantly lower than that for banks in of all other secondaries. When market share is included in the regressions, it is insignificant in all specifications.
In regression (2) of Table 4 we include additional dummy variables to capture the identity of the seller. In the multivariate setting, investment trusts have significantly positive performance after the offering (see footnote 23 for a detailed discussion of trusts). No other dummy variable is significant and the insider dummy variable remains significantly negative.
Regressions (3) and (4) of Table 4 In regression (3) of Table 4 , the coefficient on the change in ownership of the seller is negative and significant. The sign and significance of the insider dummy is unaffected, however. In regression (4), the change in insider ownership is not significant and the coefficient on the insider dummy again remains significant. Thus even after 26 We also examine the firm characteristics of these subsamples. Firms for which seller ownership is available are slightly larger than our overall sample. The market capitalization of the insider subsample is $724 million, versus $666 million for all insiders. The non-insider subsample has a market capitalization of $1212 million, versus $1002 million for all non-insiders. The market-to-book ratios and announcement period returns are similar to the whole samples, however. To determine whether the reduced sample size creates biases for our analysis we replicate regression (1) of Table 4 using the smaller sample. Results are virtually identical to that found using the full sample suggesting that sample selection bias is not a serious problem.
controlling for changes in ownership, firms in which insiders are selling in the secondary issue perform worse than when non-insiders are selling.
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We also examine whether our long-run results can be attributed to changes in institutional ownership. Data on institutional ownership is collected from Spectrum. In unreported results, three-year mean abnormal returns are -46.8% (median = -63.0%) when the seller is a non-insider and institutional ownership decreases versus 14.7%
(median = -2.2%) when the seller is a non-insider and institutional ownership increases.
These numbers are significantly different from each other at the one-percent level (pvalue=0.001). Likewise, the three-year abnormal returns are -101.6% (median = -47.6%) when the seller is an insider and institutional ownership decreases versus -18.5%
(median = -43.9%) when the seller is an insider and institutional ownership increases.
These returns are also significantly different (p-value = 0.04). When we include a dummy variable taking the value 1 if institutional ownership decreases and the seller is an insider (non-insider) to regression 1 of Table 4 , the coefficient is -0.978 (-0.581) with a p-value of 0.06 (0.01). The coefficient on the insider dummy remains negative and significant in this specification (p-value = 0.031). When the change in institutional ownership is added to the regressions in Table 4 , however, its coefficient is insignificant.
Finally, we include the abnormal return at the announcement of a secondary offering (as reported in Table 2 ) as an independent variable in regression (5) of Table 4 .
The coefficient on the abnormal announcement period return is not significant (p=0.764).
This is not consistent with Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam's (1998) underreaction theory. 27 The number of trust observations in these regressions drops to nine, which probably explains
Factor Regressions.
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The analysis to this point has focused on buy-and-hold abnormal returns. While this approach yields an abnormal return measure that accurately represents investor experience, it is particularly sensitive to the problem of a poorly specified asset-pricing model. Fama (1998) proposes to alleviate the bad asset-pricing problem by using the rolling calendar month portfolio methodology first employed by Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974) . In each calendar month, a portfolio is formed which includes firms that had a secondary offering in the previous five years. We report evidence based on equally weighted portfolios, although the findings are similar using value-weighted portfolios. The calendar time returns on these portfolios are used to estimate the following regression model first proposed by Fama and French (1993):
where R pt is the monthly return on the calendar-time portfolio (equal-or value-weighted), R ft is the monthly return on the three-month Treasury bills, R mt is the return on a valueweighted market index, SMB t is the difference in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and big stocks, and HML t is the difference in the returns of a valueweighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks. The estimate of the intercept term, α i , provides a measure of the mean monthly abnormal return on the calendar-time portfolio. 29 the lack of significance on the trust dummy variable coefficient. 28 We thank James Davis and Ken French for providing us with the Fama-French factors, and Espen Eckbo, Ron Masulis, and Oyvind Norli for providing us with their factors. 29 Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue that the Fama-French three-factor model tends to underestimate abnormal returns in situations where the event being studied is a managerial choice variable, such as secondary equity offerings or repurchases. Using simulations, they show that when the Fama-French three-factor model is used, misvaluation is most severe among small firms Panel A of Table 5 reports the results from the Fama-French three-factor regressions. For the full sample, the intercept is an insignificant -0.22%. In contrast, Brav, Gezcy, and Gompers (2000) and Loughran and Ritter (2000) find negative and significant intercepts when examining firms making primary secondary equity offerings.
The second and third regressions in Panel A split the sample into those offerings made by insiders and those made by non-insiders. The results for offerings made by non-insiders are similar to those of the full sample. However, when Fama-French regressions are run on the offerings made by insiders in the firm, the intercept is -0.50% (p=0.036), indicating that these firms tend to underperform by almost one-half percent per month.
Compounding this over five years results in economically significant underperformance of almost 26%, consistent with our univariate buy-and-hold return results.
Within the non-insider group we also look separately at investment funds and 'other' (these are the only subgroups large enough to allow for reasonable sized portfo lios over time). The results for these subgroups are similar to those for all noninsiders.
Finally we replicate the analysis over different subperiods and for different intervals of long-run returns. When the regressions are run using only those secondary sales that take place in the 1990s, or when the portfolios are formed by including in month t any firm that completed a secondary offering in the previous three years, the results are virtually the same. The intercepts are negative and significant when the sale is by insiders, but insignificant for other groups.
in high volume periods. Consequently, value-weighting abnormal returns tends to reduce the power of the hypothesis tests further. Abnormal returns calculated using buy-and-hold returns and benchmark portfolios chosen on the basis of size, with each firm equally weighted, are better able to capture the true abnormal return. These criticisms notwithstanding, we examine calendar time portfolio returns as a robustness check to our previous findings.
Recent evidence by Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) indicates that commonly used test statistics are positively biased at an annual horizon and negatively biased at a threeor five-year horizon when sample firms have strong pre-event return performance. In order to control for this bias, we measure average monthly abnormal returns using Carhart's (1997) four-factor model. Based on the empirical findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) , Carhart extends the Fama-French model to capture the momentum effect by including another factor, measured as the difference between the return on a high momentum portfolio and the return to a low momentum portfolio. To account for this additional factor, we estimate the following regression model:
where PR1YR t is the prior return factor from Carhart (1997), and the other variables are as defined earlier. Table 5 reports the results from four-factor model regressions on the equal-weighted rolling portfolios. Inclusion of the fourth factor does not substantially change the results. The fourth factor is not significant in any of the factor regressions, but the intercept remains significant for the subsample of offers in which insiders are selling.
Panel B of
Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000) test a factor model employing macroeconomic factors found in the asset pricing literature.
They find evidence that issuer underperformance reflects lower systematic risk exposure for issuing firms relative t o their matches. They claim that as issuers lower their leverage, their exposure to unexpected inflation and default risk decreases, thus decreasing the stock's expected return. Panel C of Table 5 thus examines the underperformance of our secondary issues using these factors. As in the Fama-French and Carhart factor models, the coefficient on the intercept is negative and significant for the insider group only. This reinforces our conclusion that the subsample of firms in which insiders sell through a secondary issue exhibit significantly negative returns in the post-issue period.
In addition to calendar-time portfolio regressions, we examine the mean monthly 
Operating Performance of Secondary Issuers
This section examines the operating performance of secondary issuers versus matching firms to determine whether the poor stock returns following a secondary offering by insiders are linked to changes in profitability. Matching firms are chosen using a variant of Loughran and Ritter's (1997) procedure. Each issuing firm is matched with a firm that has not issued equity during the previous three years using the following algorithm: all non-issuers with year 0 assets of 90 percent to 110 percent of the issuer are ranked, and the firm with the closest OIBD / assets is used. 30 Due to the skewness of accounting ratios, we follow conventional operating perfo rmance methodology and report medians.
Panel A of Table 6 examines the median OIBD/assets for the firms with secondary sales over the years -3 to +3 relative to the offering. 31 For offerings made by both non-insiders and insiders, OIBD/assets increases f rom year -3 to year 0, and then declines afterward. This pattern is observable for each class of sellers. For the insider group, however, the median ratios are much higher to begin with, and the post-offer decline is much more severe.
Panel B of Table 6 examines the median performance of matching firms. We use Wilcoxon signed-rank tests to test for the equality of the distributions between issuers and their matching firms (reported in parentheses). For both the non-insider and insider groups, there is significantly positive operating performance in the years leading up to the offering (although none of the non-insider subgroups exhibit significant performance).
Abnormal performance (issuing firm performance less matching firm performance) after the is sue is generally insignificant for each group of sellers. Comparing the insider to the non-insider group, the abnormal performance in the years prior to the issue is much higher for the insider group, and falls more dramatically after the issue. 30 Loughran and Ritter initially try to match to firms in the same two-digit SIC code with end of year assets within 25 percent and 200 percent of the issuing firm. In the case of secondary offerings , we are typically unable to find close performance matches using this first filter. Barber and Lyon (1997) indicate that it is important to match on performance. Therefore, we do not match on industry.
Panel C of Table 6 examines the significance of changes in the abnormal performance measures from the year before or the year of the offering to several years after the offering. For secondary offers by non-insiders, there are no significant decreases in abnormal operating performance from 0 to +2 or 0 to +3 after the offering (this result holds across subgroups). In contrast, secondary offers by insiders perform significantly worse on a matching firm adjusted basis in the two to three years after the issue, whe n compared to the year of or the year before the issue.
In Table 7 we examine whether these findings hold in a multivariate setting.
Specifically, we regress the change in abnormal accounting performance (abnormal accounting performance one year prior to the offering less abnormal performance two years after the offering) on a number of control variables considered previously such as stock price runup, size of the firm, and market-to-book. In regression (1) of Table 7 , we also include a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the seller is an insider, as defined previously.
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After controlling for size, market to book, and prior stock performance, the coefficient on the insider dummy is positive and significant. Abnormal performance declines significantly for firms with insider sales, consistent with the univariate findings.
Regressions (2) and (3) of Table 7 examine the effect of changes in the ownership of sellers and insiders around the offering. Changes in seller ownership and insider ownership are defined as in Table 4 . In regression (2) of Table 7 , the coefficient on the change in ownership of the seller is positive and significant at the 10% level. The sign 31 Similar results are obtained using alternative performance measures like return on assets or profit margin. 32 The results are similar if we look at the change in performance from one year prior to the offering to three years after the offering.
and significance of the insider dummy is unaffected, however. In regression (3), the change in insider ownership is not significant and the coefficient on the insider dummy again remains significant. Thus even after controlling for changes in ownership, abnormal performance declines more significantly in firms where insiders are selling.
In contrast to our results, Loughran and Ritter (1997) find that issuer performance improves one to two years prior to secondary equity offerings, but deteriorates afterwards relative to their matched firms. In the case of secondary offerings, our findings suggest that the market expects the above average performance at the time of the offering to continue, and is disappointed when it doesn't materialize. To formally test this hypothesis, we replicate regression (1) of Table 4 adding the change in operating performance (performance in year -1 relative to the offering minus performance in year +2 relative to the offering) as an independent variable. Change in operating performance is significantly negative, consistent with the conjecture that abnormal stock returns are related to changes in abnormal performance.
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As a final part of our analysis, we examine abnormal stock returns around quarterly earnings announcements following the secondary offering. If insiders are able to time their offerings and the announcement period return is not complete, then the market should be consistently disappointed by the quarterly earnings announcements following the offering. In contrast, there should be no systematic stock price reaction when the seller is non-insider.
To examine this story, we follow the methodology of Cornett, Mehran, and Tehranian (1998). For each firm in our sample, we obtain the announcement dates for 33 The coefficient on change in operating performance is significant at the 1% level. The coefficients on other independent variables are similar in magnitude and significance to that reported in Table 4 . Importantly, the coefficient on the Insider dummy is -0.208 (p = 0.036).
The sample size in the regression is 357 and the R 2 is 0.089.
the quarterly earnings announcements from the quarterly COMPUSTAT tapes. We then compute abnormal returns over the window from announcement date -1 to announcement date +1. The results are generally supportive of the above story. For the non-insider sample, the average abnormal returns for quarters +1 to +4 following the offering are -0.04%, 0.54%, 0.75%, and 0.26% respectively. None of these values is statistically significant at the 10% level. For the insider sample, the corresponding averages are -2.30%, -1.06%, -0.65%, and -0.61%. The -2.30 percent from quarter+1 is statistically significant at the 5% level. The differences in abnormal returns between the insider and non-insider samples for each quarter are statically significant at the 5% level or better.
Overall, examination of the operating performance of firms issuing secondary shares indicates that the poor stock return performance of issues made by insiders is due in part to poor operating performance. The operating performance of these firms relative to their matching firms is extremely high in the years prior to the offer, and falls dramatically afterwards. These declines in operating performance are much larger, in both a statistical and economic sense, than the corresponding declines for their matching firms. The declines are also much more severe than those experienced by firms in which non-insiders make the offer. These results are consistent with Loughran and Ritter's anchoring theory. Insiders sell in secondary issues following periods of extremely good performance. Although these firms continue to perform well relative to their matching firms after the issue, performance in the post-issue period declines dramatically relative to the pre-issue period. Since they expect the pre-issue performance to continue, investors are disappointed in this performance decline, and this is reflected in the negative stock price reaction.
Summary and Conclusion
We extend earlier research on secondary equity offers by examining not only announcement period returns, but also the long-run stock and operating performance of these f irms. On average, abnormal returns following secondary equity offerings are positive but not significant. This contrasts sharply with the significantly negative performance of primary issuers that has been documented in the recent literature.
Consistent with windows of opportunity, however, we find that for the subsample of secondary issuers in which the seller can be classified as an insider, both three-and fiveyear post-issue abnormal returns are negative and significant. These results are robust to a number of alternative methods for measuring abnormal performance.
We also examine the operating performance of secondary offers made by insiders and non-insiders. Although both groups exhibit positive abnormal performance prior to the issue relative to a matched firm, the offers made by insiders experience a decline in the post-issue period relative to the offers made by non-insiders. Further, the change in abnormal performance from the pre-issue to the post-issue period is significantly negative for the insider group, but not for the non-insider group. Overall, we interpret this evidence as consistent with insiders exploiting windows of opportunity by issuing shares that are overvalued because the market incorrectly believes that strong past accounting performance will continue into the future. Windows of opportunity appear to arise as investors anchor their expectations of future operating performance on past trends, as noted by Loughran and Ritter (1997) . We find little support, however, for the notion put forward by Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) that investors are underreacting to information in the announcement of a secondary sale. This table shows the means (medians) for a variety of firm characteristics. Market capitalization is the number of shares outstanding on the offer date times the offering date closing price. Market-to-book is calculated by dividing the market value of equity at the close of the issue day by the book equity value after the issue. Offering size is calculated by multiplying the number of shares offered by the offering price. Average daily trading volume is calculated over the period announcement date -250 to announcement date -1. Announcement period abnormal returns are calculated relative to the CRSP value weighted index. AD is the announcement date of the offering, measured as the earliest of the Dow Jones News Retrieval announcement date and the SDC filing date. OD is the offer date. The p-values for tests of differences across the samples are based on standard t-tests for the mean and a Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the median. * denotes significance at the 1% level or lower, based on a standard t-test. Returns are calculated using CRSP data ending December 31, 1999. This table reports mean and median 1-, 3-, and 5-year raw and abnormal returns by type of selling shareholder for a sample of 424 pure secondary offerings between 1980 and 1996. Each sample firm is matched to a reference portfolio on the basis of size, market-to-book, and prior performance. Excess performance is calculated as the difference between the buy-and-hold return for the sample firm and the average buy-and-hold return of the matching portfolio. All abnormal returns are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. The p-values for mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns are calculated using the empirical distribution. P-values for the medians are from the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. This table regresses three-year abnormal returns on the identity of the selling shareholder for a sample of secondary offerings between 1980 and 1996. Abnormal performance is calculated as the difference between the buy-and-hold return for the sample firm and the buy-and-hold return of a size and market-to-book matching portfolio. Runup is the raw buy-and-hold return in the year prior to the issue. Market capitalization is the number of shares outstanding on the offer date times the offering date closing price, measured in billions. Market-to-book is calculated by dividing the market value of equity at the close of the issue day by the book equity value after issue. Insider Dummy equals 1 if the seller is a firm insider, and 0 otherwise. Trust Dummy equals 1 if the seller is a trust, and 0 otherwise. Investment fund dummy equals 1 if the seller is an investment fund, and 0 otherwise. Non-discretionary insider dummy equals 1 if the seller is a non-discretionary insider, and 0 otherwise. Change in seller ownership is the percentage of outstanding equity shares owned by the seller after the offering less the percentage of equity shares owned by the seller before the offering. Change in insider ownership is the percentage of outstanding equity shares owned by insiders after the offering less the percentage of equity shares owned by insiders before the offering. Abnormal announcement period return is calculated from day -1 to +1 relative to the CRSP value-weighted index (see Table 2 ). All returns are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. p-values are in parentheses.
Non-insider Subgroups
(1) R p -R f = a p + b p (R m -R f ) + s p SMB + h p HML + ε p R m -R f is the return on a portfolio formed by subtracting the one-month Treasury bill rate from the value weighted market return. SMB is the difference each month between the return on small firms and big firms. HML is the difference each month between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. The models is: R pt -R f = α p + β 1 RM t +β 2 ∆RPC t +β 3 (BAA-AAA) t +β 4 UI t +β 5 (20y -1yr) t +β 6 TBILLSpr t +ε t Where RM is the excess return on the market index, RPC is the percent change in real per capita consumption of nondurable goods, BAA-AAA is the difference in the monthly yield changes on bonds rated BAA and AAA by Moody's, UI is unanticipated inflation, 20y-1y is the return difference between treasury bonds with 20 years to maturity and 1 year to maturity, and TBILLspr is the return difference between 90-day and 30-day Treasury Bills. The dependent variable in the regressions is the abnormal accounting performance (OIBD/assets) one year before the secondary offering subtract the abnormal accounting performance two years after the offering. Independent variables include the raw buy-and-hold return in the year prior to the issue (Runup), the number of shares outstanding on the offer date times the offering date closing price, measured in billions (Market capitalization), and he Market-to-book ratio, calculated by dividing the market value of equity at the close of the issue day by the book equity value after issue. Insider Dummy equals 1 if the seller is a firm insider, and 0 otherwise. Change in seller ownership is the percentage of outstanding equity shares owned by the seller after the offering less the percentage of equity shares owned by the seller before the offering. Change in insider ownership is the percentage of outstanding equity shares owned by insiders after the offering less the percentage of equity shares owned by insiders before the offering. T-statistics are in parentheses.
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